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UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND CLASS-FORMATION: THE -ORIGINS OF MIGRANT LABOUR IN NAMIBIA,
1850 - 1915(1)
In Namibia the evolution of the principal stages of colonial exploitation was
telescoped into a 2O-year period under German rule. Only in the 1890s was over
, half a century of "informal colonialism", whose chief agents were intinerant
•\ . traders and missionaries, reinforced by German military intervention. Yet by
the outbreak of the Great War, most of the land in southern and central Namibia
had been expropriated, some of it already settled with immigrant farmers, internal
resistance crushed, and the Naraib diamond deposits and Tsumeb copper, today still
the territory's main mineral resources, put into full production by international
mining capital. None of the sectors of capital which developed during this period
had more than a marginal interest in the human resources of the country except
as labour-power; and its recruitment, distribution and control was from the start
a principal function of colonial administration. However, because of the particula
historical conditions of that first phase of colonialisation, the forcible
separation of subsistence agriculturalists from their means of production was
never completed; and the level of recruitment from the ranks of the dispossessed
consistently failed to meet the aggregate labour demand of colonial capital. The
closing of this gap with contracted migrant labour, and the latter's long-term
reproduction, was therefore the central motive for the conservation of the
remaining areas of subsistence production by both German and South African
administrations. It is with this section of the Naraibian working class that I am
concerned in this paper.
*• In the vast, sparsely-populated Kalahari basin the Ovambo-Nkhumbi cluster forms
an isolated area of dense settlement. From the late 1840s, with the roughly
simultaneous penetration of the interior from the base ports of Walvis Bay and
Mossamedes, Ovaraboland became the interface of competition between two rival
trading and missionary networks. Before the turn of the century productive
investment nowhere extended much beyond coastal guano workings and fish processing.
Thereafter, however, the rapidly increasing scale of particularly German infra-
structural investment, especially in railways, and the opening of Tsumeb (1906)
and the diamond fields (1908) multiplied the demand for labour overnight far beyond
the supply capacity of the population under colonial rule - the post-1905 forced
labour regime notwithstanding - particularly after the genocide of c40% of the
latter in the 1904-7 war. Since these capitals were both large-scale employers
and few in number, they could sustain both the costs and the necessary degree of
collaboration for the systematic recruitment of migrant labour from outside the
sphere of forced labour. Usually excluded from the international indentured labour
market, which, when accessible, was anyway relatively costlier, both the state and
the mines turned to Ovamboland as their only remaining captive resource, although
not before 1915 v/as it subjected to either formal or indirect colonial rule. Why
Ovambos should nevertheless have resorted to recurrent labour migration, and in sue
large numbers, it is the task of this paper to explain.
1. PRE-COLONIAL SOCIAL FORMATIONS
The form of subsistence practised in the northern areas has been conditioned
to a great extent by their ecological limitations(2). The interior is separated
from the coast by both the Naraib desert and the western rim of the continential
plateau, which South of the Cunene broadens into a rugged desolate area capable
of supporting at best a dispersed pastoralism. The plateau itself forms a vast
inward-sloping bowl centering on mid-Botswana, which is covered with a layer
of sand in places over 1OOO ft. thick. The rainfall is entirely concentrated
into a few summer months, particularly towards the South and West, and increases
gradually from South to North, as do average temperatures. In such conditions
the factor most crucial to subsistence is the water balance. Over a large area
including N. Botswana, much of N. and NE. Namibia, and central and SE Angola,
average rainfall does not exceed the actual and accumulated water deficit(3)
at the height of the summer rains. As a result, there is little run-off, and
only local and short-lived accumulations of surface water; and the lack of water
supplies at or near the surface during the long dry season makes survival for
man and stock during the long dry winter next to impossible. Stock-raising and
crop cultivation are thus largely restricted to the valleys of the few perennial
rivers.
^ • Within this region the one exception is Ovaraboland itself (4), comprising an area
more or less equally distributed either side of the present Angola-Namibia
border. Cut off to the West by the Kaokoveld and to the South, East, North and
NW by waterless "omaheke", only across the Cunene River, its boundary to the NW
and W, is it in direct contact with a settled peasantry. The land surface forms
a perfectly flat plain, with an average gradient from N to S of no more than
•" 1:10,OOO (or 6in. to one mile), from which the accumulated summer rainfall, held
by an impervious sub-soil layer in a maze of shallow channels (oshana), drains
and evaporates only slowly. In normal years the rains are supplemented by the
floodwaters of the Cuvelai, a wet-season river which drains an area between the
Cubango (Okavango) and the Cunene through the oshana network into Etosha Pan.
Although below about 20ft the groundwater becomes brackish, the sandy oshana beds
usually retain a sufficient proportion of the annual supply to replenish shallow v
during the dry season, and thus make possible a sedentary form of subsistence.
On the other hand, the annual rainfall is highly unreliable: combined totals for
the northern half of Namibia(5) for 75 of the 77 years 1883/4-1959/60 indicate
no fewer than 10 years of drought (7o-84% of average), 14 of severe (55-69%) and
6 of very severe drought (less than 55%) , as well as 20 abnormally good (more
( than 115%), leaving only 25 in the normal range (85-115%). Furthermore, because
it falls as showers, its distribution is often very unequal, even over short
distances. Since normal rains are marginal to both crops and the survival of
stock through the winter, both forms of subsistence are precarious. Cultivation
is further hampered by the lack of fertile heavy soils, and stock-raising by the
high concentration of salt deposits, by a pasture deficiency in phosphorous
which can cause disease (6), and by endemic diseases such as lung-sickness.
These ecological conditions gave rise to two similar but separate forms of
subsistence, in addition to the San hunter-gatherers of the vast dry plains.
On the one hand, the perennial rivers made crop-raising possible on the rich
valley soils, provided man and stock with continuous water-supplies, and also
fish. The first descriptions of the Okavango valley at the turn of the century
indicate a dense population settled along the North bank(7). "Werft reiht sich
an Werft, am ganzen Talrande entlang sind susgedefente Kornfelder. Der leichte,
mit rotem Lehm vermischto Boden ist sehr fruchbar; obne dass gedlingt wird, werdon
jahrlich zwei gute Ernten erzieht"*(8). Because much of the flat valley floor
*Werfts (Kraals) follow on one after the other; broad cornfields extend along the
whole of the side of the valley. The light soil, mixed with red loam, is very
fertile; without being manured it yields two good harvests a year.
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was flooded annually, crops were planted mostly on the low valley sides or top,
and a seasonal migration took place between villages on the river bank and on the
valley rim(9). Despite the availability of rich pasture-land left by the retreatln
floods, little stock appears to have been kept except by the easternmost tribe,
the Kuangari, who could also make use of a few oshana on their SW flank(io).
On the other hand, the peculiar flood-system of the oshana made possible for the
Ovambo a nearly equal balance.between the sedentary agriculture and a semi-nomadic
pastoralism(ll). The accounts of early explorers in the latter half of the 19th
century suggest an already dense population settled in dispersed family kraals
and an intensive field agriculture. Because of the lack of dry season surface
water, settlement has been concentrated almost entirely along or near the
oshanas(12); the oshana network is, however, so intricate as to permit nearly
continuous cultivation of the land. It would appear that the outer limits of
cultivable land had already been reached by the mid-19th century(l3); but it is
not clear how much remained unused within the region. Each of the 7 or 8
principal tribes occupied an area of continuous and dense settlement - Galton
estimated the population density of Ondonga in 1851 at 100 per sq. mile (14) -
separated from each other by strips of virgin woodland of varying width(15).
Arriving shortly after the harvest, Galton1s first impressions(16) are typical
of 19th century descriptions of the country: "Fine, dense timber trees, and
innumerable palms of all sizes, were scattered over it. Part was bare of pasturage
part was thickly covered in high corn stubble; palisadings, each of which enclosed
a homestead, were scattered everwhere over the country. The general appearance
was that of a most abundant fertility".
The wide variety in the means of subsistence point to a full exploitation of the
available natural resources(17). The products of the two grain crops, meal, the
staple food, from pearl millet and a nutritious beer from sorghum, ware supplemented
by a range of vegatables and spices, by cow's and goat's milk, eggs, and sometimes
meat, by fish swept down in the floodwaters, by game, and by the fruit-bearing
trees, which were protected. Given the limitations of the water supply and of
an iron-age technology, such diversity in subsistence production of itself
presupposed not only the full use of potentially available labour-time within
the family unit of production, but also its efficient deployment in the production
cycle. Towards the end of the dry season, the fields were tilled by hand and
fertilized with collected cow-dung; planting began soon after the first rains,
and was followed in turn by the transplanting, weeding, guarding and harvesting of
the grain crops, as well as the subsidiaries. Small stock and poultry were kept
at the werft, but in order to eke out dry season pasture, an annual cattle
migration took place during the rains to the uninhabited "oshimpolo" to the
East and North, and probably also to cattle posts on the outskirts of the tribal
lands toward the end of the winter (18). These two activities absorbed the
bulk of family labour, especially where drought necessitated a second or third
plarfrng or a more extensive search for pasture. Despite the fairly rigid productic
sequence, some concentration of activities was inevitable, as, for instance, fruit-
gathering, fishing and harvesting at the end of the rainy season. Correspondingly,
the general level of activity would slacken during 3-4 months of the winter drought
With the subsistence base at so relatively advanced a stage of development, it is
to be expected that the relations of production had already become fairly complex.
The organisation of production depended on a sophisticated division of labour, in
effect primarily sexual, within the family unit. The field area surrounding each
werft extended as far as the labour-time devoted to it permitted, and was separatee
from its neighbours by a variable strip of common land retained for pasturage.
Nearly all aspects of cultivation were the responsibility of women; with polygamy
normal, each wife worked her husband's field as well as her own, which was
alloted to her at the beginning of each season. Women also undertook most of
the household work, an arduous task given the size and elaborate functional sub-
division of the werft(19), a number of home crafts, and some of the seasonal
fishing. Men were responsible for the supervision of production and the manifold
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tasks associated with its organisation, for some crafts, fishing, hunting and
above all for the herding of cattle. Children generally participated according
• • to sex and age, but a considerable proportion of their time was spent in herding
the small stock. The scale of production was thus closely related to functional
divisions within the family, although large-scale activities such as grain-harvesti
or the moving of a werft required the cooperative participation of neighbouring
families, and the regulation of the seasonal production cycle depended in
important respects on tribal as well as the family head's authority.
Outside the family unit, the specialisation of labour appers to have been limited.
The level and diversity of normal production, together with local seasonal var-
iations in rainfall, stimulated an active internal trade in food and home-craft
artefacts(20); but trading itself was conducted mostly by the producers themselves
rather than by intermediaries. On the other hand, long-distance and some inter-
tribal trading, usually based on the monopoly of a particular material, was usuall;
controlled by specialist artisans, subject to tribal supervision(21). Ondonga,
Ukwanyama and Ukwambi, for instance, sent out regular and efficiently organised
1
 caravans to collect respectively copper from Otavi, iron from S. Angola, and
salt from the Etosha Pan area, and subsequently bartered the refined product
or manufactured articles to tribes near and far. However, although internal
r> trade had developed a rough scale of exchange rates and even a form of currency(22
- • • - and was to provide an important en try-point for foreign traders, only smiths and
doctors had managed to form functionally independent guilds with monopolies of
particular skills(23).
In general, then, it may be tentatively suggested that by the mid-19th century
" the forces of production in Ovamboland had developed a little in advance of the
" relations of production, and that the average level and content of production
at times exceeded immediate subsistence needs. It is possible to discern even at
this distance incipient lines of horizontal social differentiation on the tribal
. as well as the family level. The existence of a partially independent but
. restricted petty-bourgeoisie has already been noted. Of great significance was .
the emergence in each of the numerically largest tribes of a strong autarchival
state centred on an absolute monarchy(24), and capable of devising and monopolisin
methods of surplus appropriation. The state attained its most developed form
in the two largest kingdoms, Ukwanyama and Ondonga, but their medium-sized
neighbours to the West, Ukwambi, Ongandjora, Ukwaluthi, and Ombalantu, were
for the most part evolving along similar lines. Its power existed partly in
proportion to is functional utility, and not : merely in the form of ritual, as
! ( the regulator of a complex seasonal cycle of production. Its ability to
j.. forecast accurately the onset of the rains was of some importance to the success
of crop planting, since the first showers were often light and premature, and if
followed by several weeks1 drought could cause the failure of the first sowing(25)
• It enforced a "rough system of rotation of pasture land": "wells and cacimbas
were maintained; the tunda was grazed during the rainy season,..; the areas
adjacent to the cacindas, talas, and rivers were reserved for the dry season
when water was unavailable in the tunda"*(26). Correspondingly, subsistence
farmers derived a degree of security from the maintenance of internal order
and protection from external raids. Furthermore, long distance and inter-tribal
trading depended on state protection, and its monopoly of distribution at least
usually ensured general access to imports(27).
The power of the state, however, leant heavily on its control of instruments of
coercion, and this reliance was probably already increasing. In this equation,
its relation to land as a resource was basic. It will be recalled that land was
by the mid-19th century, internally at least, often a "closed resource", within
the family unit, the extent of each wife's fields and the labour-time to be
expended on the husband*s were specified annually by the werft head, and most of
* cacimba - small dry-season reservoir; tunda - sandveld; tala - permanent pool i
stream bed
the product of their labour, from both land and stock, became their own property(28).
At the level of the tribe, the standard right of every man to clear virgin land
for production remained; but internally the tribal official's control over the
allocation of used land enabled him to gain the right to exact tribute from "tenants"
and to evict them(29). At some stage the Ukwanyama and Ondonga kings also began
to grant territorial rights to their more powerful noblemen against the payment
of tribute, but it is riot certain to what extent the tribal "aristocracy",
hereditary by matrilineal descent in the royal line, can be described as feudal
lords, as there is little evidence of a hereditary accumulation of property(3O) .
Rather, it is clear from 19th century accounts that state authority was strongly
concentrated in the monarchy, and that aristocratic power and social standing
was exercised through the state hierarchy. The royal kraal was very definitely
the administrative, military and social centre of the kingdom; and the nightly
"balls" at the Ondonga capital described by Galton in 1851(31), with their elegance
and formal dance routines, are evidence of an already well-developed court life,
with the occasional striking resemblance to its medieval European counterparts.
Despite the elaborate royal kraal, the large and rigidly organised household, and
the maintenance costs of court subsistence, the rate of surplus appropriation
was probably not great and the methods of collection routine. The general tribute
was paid in kind, its size and timing depending on royal or aristocratic needs,
and on the establishment of customary rights on certain products (32). The king
could also require of his subjects military service and unpaid labour in his
fields and on such major projects as the moving of the royal kraal(33). Finally
the royal monopoly on foreign trade permitted the manipulation of the rates of
br-jrtnrexchange, and the taxation of goods bartered outside the tribe, principally
cattle. Since the Ovambo tribes, mostly Ondonga and Ukwanyama, exported copper
and iron artefacts on a large scale to the Nama and Herero to the South, to the
tribes on the Okavango and probably further East, and across the Cunene, barter-
exchange was an important element in surplus appropriation by the state. The
Ondonga caravan encountered by Galton near Otavi, which in 3 weeks' trading
amassed a herd of over 2OO cattle, was said to be but one of 4 regular expenditions
to northernHereroland each year(34). Itinerant smiths carried the trade to a
much wider area. According to an American trader writing 25 years later, "parties
of Ovambo smiths are to be found all over Daroaraland. They bring with them a small
stock of iron and copper and travel about ... making knives, arrowheads, spear-
heads, beads and rings, for which they receive sheep and goats which they again
trade for cows where they can; and after a year or two they go back with a small
herd, most of which they are required to give to their king(35).
2. EXTERNAL TRADE AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT, 185O-1915.
Thus by the time the first explorers, traders and missionaries penetrated Ovamboland,
the subsistence social formation was in the first stage of evolution towards a
class-divided society whose extent and particular form was still uncertain. It is
difficult in the case of Ovamboland and virtually impossible for the riverene
tribes further East to differentiate between changes induced respectively by
11
 underdevelopment" and by pre-existing tendencies. But the fact that fairly
specific alterations in the rate and methods of surplus appropriation occurred
simultaneously with a general decline in the productive base supports circumstantial
evidence of broad causal links between the two processes.
The agents of what may be called "informal colonialmism" came from three directions.
From the South, after Galton's pioneering expedition in 1851, came itinerant
white traders of various nationalities, usually seeking ivory and ostrich feathers,
but sometimes also bringing out cattle for the Cape market(36). The rise of
wholesale monopolies in Hereroland, the first organised by Andersson in the early
186Os, the second by Ohlsson and Eriksson at the end of the decade, facilitated
the dispatch of traders provisioned on credit to the far North and East(37). The
course of the trade during the Nama-Herero of the 1880s and German colonial rule
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is uncertain. That trading in arras continued is demonstrated by the fact that
the Germans tried to prevent it, without apparent success(38).Farther East, the
trade-route to Lake Mgami and the Kalahari interior, and North of it another
to the mid-Okavango, became well-established in the 1870s. The second source of
white interlopers was the Afrikaner rr-puMici: to the SE. During the 1870s Boer
trekkers began to migrate across the Kalahari, and from about 1880, when their
leaders secured settlement rights on the Humpata plateau from the Portuguese,
kept up an irregular two-way stream for more than 40 years(39). Their main route
via Ngami and the lower Okavango skirted Ovamboland to the North(40), but
numbers passed through from the South and East via Grootfontein, where several
temporary settlements were started. The trekkers were still "primarily waggoners
and professional hunters"(41); nevertheless the extent of their activities in
Ovamboland is as yet unclear.
The third major trading thrust to penetrate Ovamboland was based on the port of
Mossamedes and to a lesser degree, Bonguela and Luanda(42). The influence of the
great East-West trade routes through central Angola in the 17th and 18th centuries
does not seem to have touched the region either directly or indirectly. With their
breakdown in the 1850s and 60s, Ovimbundu cattle-raiding and Cokwe trade and
migration may well have reached the Northern tribes(43). The fact that Galton
found that firearms were unknown and that trade across the Cunene was conducted s
by black traders and consisted in "brandy, beads and assegais"(44), indicates v
that Mossamedes traders had not then reached the river. They di so, however,
within the next 5 years: a fort was established at Numbo (Nkhumbi) in 1857,
and extensive trading in ivory, ostrich feathers and slaves by white and black
intermediaries carried on until the Portuguese conquest(45).
Information on the Okavango and further East is sparse, although Seiner gives
a comprehensive picture for 1905-6(46). White traders penetrated to the Okavango
from central Namibia, via Ngami from southern Botswana, and from the Zambezi;
Seiner found no fewer than 3 stores on its lower reaches during his journeys(47).
It was also the main trek-route for migrating Boers. In addition, there appears
to have been an active internal trade, augmented by artefacts broughtby long-
distance Ndebele and Ovambo traders. Finally, the ubiquitous half-caste slavers,
"Mambari aus Benguela", had a long-established route down the Okavango at least
as far as Andara(48).
It is impossible to calculate the scale of trading or its impact on the
subsistence mode with any great precision. The main import was arms and
ammunition, supplemented on the Portuguese side by brandy, the mainstay of the
coastal sugar plantations, and horses; more generally by ornaments, particularly
beads, and later by European clothes and a wider range of manufactures. The arms
trade is probably the best gauge of overall trading activity. By the late
1850s the G donga king had already acquired a few muskets; and through the
1860s and 70s his successors built up a large arms reserve as traders, their
southern markets saturated, turned North to offload their surplus stocks(-49).
During the 1880s, Ukwanyama began importing Portuguese arms on a large scale, as
did smaller tribes such as the Ukwambi(50). Shortly after the turn of the century,
Ukwanyama alone was estimated to possess 15,000 guns, 8OOO of them modern; in
the battle of Mufilo in 1907, the Portuguese claimed that out of the array of
2O-25,OOO ranged against them, 7000 were armed with guns(51). 8 years later,
Pritchard reported that "almost every man in the country carries a firearm and
bandolier...11, the majority being up-to-date models(52). However, during the
last 3O-40, imports of clothing, brandy and horses, which because of their high
death rate required constant replacement, also grew to considerable proportions(53).
On the other hand, no simple assessment of the rate of "unequal exchange" is possible
on the commercial values of imports and exports. In the first place, the
concentration of state power enabled the king to exercise as much control as over
the inter-tribal barter-trading, and to establish a bargaining position of some
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strength(54). No trader could enter the tribal territory without the king's
prior permission, and when he did, his every activity was subject to close
supervision. Indeed, in the late 19th century, the northern tribes were
sufficiently powerful "to force all traders to be licensed"(55). Furthermore,
the king and his officials could and did demand substantial "gifts" in
appropriate commodities as the price of their cooperation. Alternatively, they
would restrict the trade to those goods in which they were interested, as did the
Okavango chiefs shortly after 19OO in refusing to sell their stock-piled ivory
except for arms(56). Secondly, the Ovambo kings exploited the competition between
the two sets of traders in order to lower exchange rates, to regulate the rate
of supply of essential imports and to retain strategic political control. As
early as 1858, for instance, Andersson complained that Portuguese traders were
both undercutting the rates offered by their Namibian counterparts and breaking
the latters1 self-imposed limitation on powder sales to blacks(57). in later
years, the Ovambo kings could break the German arms embargo without difficulty
by turning to Portuguese suppliers, and likewise, find markets in Ovimbundu
farms and coastal plantations for slaves long after slavery itself had been
outlawed(58).
Thirdly, as pointed out earlier, the net value gained or lost in a particular
transaction was not directly related to the exchange rates for the goods operating
in world markets. Much of the early trade, for instance, was in ivory and ostrich
feathers for arms, and the Ovambo, by initial barter and by requiring hunters
to buy the right to shoot elephant with "gifts", rapidly cornered a share of the
market themselves. Since the exchange involved neither means of production
nor of subsistence, and only a relatively small amount of labour-time, the net
gain, particularly in arms, was probably considerable. However, once the local elep-
hant and ostrich populations had been decimated by two decades of intensive hunting
during the 1860s and 70s(59), the Ovambo were forced to resort largely to cattle,
their only exportable commodity in demand amongst traders, and a resource which
was at the same time a means of production and of subsistence. Here too, the low
commercial price of the small Ovambo cow and the difficulties of transporting
them to the markets reduced their barter-value. When it is remembered that many
thousands of guns were imported after the decline in the ivory trade from the
1880s, and that each was fetching at least 12-15 cattle in Hereroland, the
drain on Ovambo cattle stocks must have been considerable. Horses too, of which
Handume, the last Ukwanyama king, alone possessed about 100, were costing as
much as 10-16 head each in 1910, and R6O-80 (unsalted) or R12O-40 (salted) in
1915{6O).
That a general decline in the level of production took place between the 1880s
and 1915 is probable on the evidence of contemporary descriptions of the country.
The devastating continent-wide rinderpest epidemic of 1897, which destroyed
nearly 90% of the huge Herero cattle-herds, must also have killed off the bulk
of the Ovambo stock (61). The impact of underdevelopment, though, was not evenly
distributed throughout the social formation, but was on the contrary conditioned
both by pre-existing tendencies towards social differentiation and by the way
in which those tendencies were modified by external trade. The state monopoly
on exchange gave the king and aristocracy not only first call on incoming goods,
but also a means of influencing their content, and of controlling their general
distribution and the rate of exchange for those commodities whose distribution
was directly controlled by the state(62). In this way, firearms and European
clothes eventually entered into common ownership(63), while horses and the more
expensive consumer goods remained an aristocratic privilege(64). The overall
pattern of import consumption was thus distorted towards non-essentials, and
their accumulation in the hands of the ruling class sharply increased the latter's
demand for commodities to offer in exchange, in other words cattle and to a
lesser extent, slaves. That demand was nevertheless in part "necessary"(65),
and the proportion increased with time as competitive re-arming and pressures
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on aristocratic legitimacy accelerated. The process was in turn to some extent
circular, in that the state's ability to appropriate the required surplus was
closely related to the supply of the instruments of coercion which that surplus
was intended to finance. In general, it was its capacity for surplus appropriation
that determined the level of ruling-class consumption.
Internally, the methods of appropriation practised were somewhat arbitrary(66).
Characteristic were the more frequent resort to "judicial raids" and forms of *
witchcraft, from which the victim's property reverted to the king; the
regularisation of tribute payments; and the imposition of a new cattle-tax
(okasavu) in ukwanyama in the 1880s, at first "voluntary*and strictly regulated,
but within 20 years little more than an arbitrary exaction in th>> bands of
the collectors and nobles. Externally, inter-tribal raiding became more
frequent, not only between the Ovambo tribes themselves but also during the
1890s on tribes far distant: "the Kwanyama regularly raided north to
Capelongo, east to the Cubango, and west into the lands of the Mbadya and
Khumbi"(67). Despite the ritual with which the occasion was clothed, "war"
expeditions were often no more than small-scale raids on a neighbouring tribe's
cattle outposts(68). Reciprocal raiding on this pattern accelerated the ^
expropriation of privately 'owned' cattle by the state, and the accumulation v
of resources by the stronger at the expense of the weaker monarchies. Irter-
tribal raiding also inflated the number of war captives, who more customcrily
held against a ransom, but now frequently sold off to slavers.
The functional expansion of the state as a mechanism of surplus appropriation
necessitated a larger apparatus of coercion. Because the growth in the rate of
accumulation was externally induced, and was not matched by the development
of the forces of production, it fell victim to its own inner dynamic of
instability. The royal household was enlarged by an inflated court staff,
by a new category of state official appointed to collect the Okasavu, ancl by
military contingents, possibly the nucleus of a standing army; and aristocratic
retinues developed similarly(69). "The subsistence and part of the "privileges"
due to the additional personnel had naturally to be drawn from the surplus it
was their function to appropriate. Their acquisition of the means to exercise
their duties efficiently - especially horses and guns - gave particular groups
a capacity for independent action which they increasingly exploited during
the 30 year period before colonisation. Most notable among these were the
"lenga", young men to whom the kings distributed horses and guns for "particular f
prowess in raids" irrespective of lineage, and who were appointed, at least ^
in Ukwanyama, as collectors of the okasavu(70). "This new privileged group...
built up large cattle herds and incorporated some of their captives into
their lineages". As early as 1866-7 Andersson had encountered an organised
force of young men under military discipline in Ukwambi; and in 1885 in the
same area, Schinz had observed of a returning war party that "die Vornehmeren
waren zu Pferde und von einem Jungen begleitet, der die Buchse....nachtrug"(71)*
The ability of the lenga and the nobility progressively to monopolise
particular forms of subsistence such as hunting, and surplus appropriation,
such as tribute or the okasavu, was undoubtedly significant, and a direct outcome
of the contradiction between the king's need to increase the rate of appropriation
and his delegating the power necessary to achieve it . In the long run too
the diminishing returns from the more efficient plundering of subsistence
production would have brought the ruling class to crisis point. Nevertheless,
while the underlying direction of change could not be reversed, except by
* The higher ranks were on horseback, each followed by a boy carrying his rifle.
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revolutionary means(73), the personality and strategic policy of the king
did much to affect its rate- Of the Ukwanyama kings, Weyulu (1883-19O3)
attempted to clear his indebtedness, with only limited success, by increasing
taxation and dispossessing many of his nobles, while curbing arbitrary exactions
and promoting welfare measures; Nanda (1903-11), a weak successor, could not
prevent the disintegration of central authority; and Mandume (1911-17) was
only able to reassert it by autocratic and violent methods(74).
Changes within tribes bordering and to the East of Ovamboland are impossible
to assess owing to lack of information. The strategic position, described
above, of those along the Qkavango and between it and the Zambezi implies a
complex and well-developed pattern of trade, and the numbers of traders and
migrants, together with their relatively smaller size, made them vulnerable
to political reprisals the Ovambo would have been able to resist. Indeed,
McKiernan describes the destruction and dispersal of one such by a combined force
of trekboers and traders, of whom he was one, in retaliation for the killing of
a trader in 1878, Nevertheless, the chiefs retained control over at least part
of trading activity, notably slaves, ivory and a kind of rubber collected and
brought in by the San(75); and were probably able to augment their authority
thereby. It is also notable that the two tribes whose power was strongest, the
Batawana, who extended their overlordship North from Lake Ngarai up the Okavango,
using it as a source of grains(76), and the Kuangari, who frightened off even
the traders and trekboers by their determined raiding(77), were both pastoralists
as well as cultivators. Generally, most of the peoples in the area surrounding
Ovamboland seem to have been affected during their last 30 years of freedom by
more frequent inter-tribal raiding and arbitrary attacks in intermediate zones:
the N. Kalahari and Okavango by the Kuangari, trekboers and the occasional
band of Griqua(78); the San and northernmost Herero, previously under Ondonga
overrule, by Boer incursions and predatory bands of Nama(79); those to the North
and West by cattle raiding from South and North, as well as the slave trade.
Even the Topnaars of Zessfontein, deep in the Kaokoveld, protested to Leutwein
in 19OO about "rSuberischen Jagdzugen" from across the Cunene(80).
Thus it was the ordinary subsistence farmers who bore the brunt of the under-
development process. Whereas Schinz could say of Ondonga in the 1880s that
"die meisten Kanner zwei Frauen besitzen, viele nur eine and wenige mehr als
zwei", Nitssche noted 25 years later that "Falle von Monogamie sind unter den Armen
nicht selten",* and Hahn in 1927 that polygamy was becaing in places a privilege
of the rich(81). Since a kraal's field-cultivating capacity was directly
proportional to the number of its womenfolk, the fact that a family head could
not afford more than one marriage reduced his family's general standard of living
and in addition its ability to store reserves to survive droughts or complete
a second planting if the first failed. During the famine of 1915, Chief Martin
told Major Pritchard "that only rains would prevent some of the poorer sections
from being wiped out by starvation"(82); and indeed, estimates of deaths during
the famine and an influenza epedemic two years later range from 15,000 to 50,000(83),
The reduction in an average family's field area further forced it to concentrate
on millet at the expense of sorghum ("kaffir-corn"), whose beer was a valuable
dietary supplement(84). Similarly, where Schinz found meat consumption from the
family's own herds fairly common, 20 years later the poorer amongst them ate
little meat relying on meal and milk (85). Alternative meat supplies were in
effect denied to commoners by the aristocratic monopoly on hunting, and the
subsequent destocking(86). It appears that there was in addition general opposition
to the increasing rate of surplus appropriation, by holding back crop production
* most men have two wifes, many only one and few more than two. Instances of
monogamy amongst the poor are not uncommon.
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and the size of herds, by leasing cattle to neighbours1 herds to minimise
the risk of losses in raids, and by direct resistance to the more arbitrary
methods of expropriation(87).
Compared with the structural effects of increasing internal pressure on
the productive base the impact of direct barter-exchange on subsistence
producers was probably less dramatic. The possession of guns and European
clothing was becoming noticeable to outsiders after 19OQ, and the normal range of
trade-goods, such as beads and ornaments, were always likely to find a ready market,
but none of these items can be classed as indispensible, and the fact that Kwanyama
iron-smiths were still working their S. Angola deposits as late as the 1920s(88)
indicates that the internal manufacture of means of production, such as hoes,
as well as home crafts, had probably not been seriously displaced before the end
of the period. The missions, so influential in the undermining of Herero and
Nama pastoralism, had gained but a limited foothold by 1915, principally in
Ondonga and Ukwanyama, where in 1911, after 4o years1 work, the Finnish and
Rhenish Missions had about 200 and 700 members respectively.(89)
s By the time the first migrants began to go South shortly after 1900, the structural
^ underdevelopment of the mode of production had already reduced a substantial
proportion of family producers(90) to the margins of subsistence at an average
level of production. Secondary lines of differentiation within the underclass
itself reduced particular groups to a sub-marginal existence, and hence into relations
of dependence. The "slavery" prevalent in Ovamboland from far back in the 19th
century(91) was in practice a loose tie of obligation usually redeemable by
payment of the debt or ransom which was its cause. But although fellow tribesmen
were not enslaved, the increasing numbers of POWs and refugees, of those
dispossessed of all means of production by raids, "judicial" or otherwise, and
of those without adequate means of subsistence, seem to have formed a category
of "working dependents" widely distributed amongst the tribal kraals. Some of
those would have been absorbed into the expanding royal and aristocratic households;
but equally, the low survival rate amongst the nobility made their retainers
frequent victims of ruling-class instability. To those should be added the small
circle of Christians and their associates, who were vulnerable not only to the
ideology of the work ethic implicit in 19th century missionary evangelism, but
also to the material demands of the church for Its upkeep and the maintenance
of appropriate social standards by its members. In other words, by the turn of
C the century alternative means of subsistence, and not simply cash earnings or
consumer hardware, were becoming a necessity for many family producers even under
normal conditions. The state monopoly on all external exchange relations made
labour-migration the only available means of bridging the existence gap,
3. LABOUR MIGRATION AND CLASS-CONSCIOUSNESS
According to the missionary Tonjes, writing In 1910, young men had begun migrating
in search of work 30 years before(92). After the turn of the century, some went
North to work on the Hossamedes and Bonguola railways; while in Namibia medium-
and large-scale employers, mainly in mining and construction, took on Ovambo workers
in increasing numbers(93). "Schwabe gibt an", wrote Dove in 1903, "dass sie unter
anderom auf den Guanofeldern am Kap Kross fast ausschlich die Arbeit verrichtet
hatten"(94)*. In 1897, "about 1500 Hereros and Ovambos" were working on the
Swakopmund-Windhoek railway (9/97-6/02), and later large numbers on the Otavi line
(10/03-06)(95). Nevertheless, before 1908 there had never been more than about
1700 Ovambos in the Police Zone at any one time; thereafter, however, the rate of
migration increased 5-fold within the space of two years:
* Schwabe says that they had almost completely taken over the work at the guano,
fields amongst other places
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Number of migrants passing annually through Namutoni and Okaukuejo:
(in 000s)
1908
O8/9
10
11
12
13
14
1-2/15
outgoing
less than 1.7
c4
9.1
9.3
6.1
11.8
8.8
0.8
total 10-15 46,1
returning
6.8
6.6
4.8
10.2
11.0
1.6
40.9
balance
2.6
2.7
1.3
1.6
-2.2
-0.8
5.2
c
Source: Nitzsche, pl33, quoting Dernburg; E.L.P. Stals, "Die Aanraking
tussen Blankes en Ovambos in Suidwes-Afrika, 1850-1915", A.Y.
for S.A. Hist., 31 no 2,1969, p.333, citing ZB.2065 Akton Nr.
W.IV.h.3.
Despite the fact that subsistence underdevelopment was already well advanced,
the German recruiting drive after 1907 was fortunate to coincide neatly v/ith
a run of bad years for subsistence production. Drought occurred in the years
1900/1-02/3, 07/8, 10/11, 12/3-15/6, with 1911 and 13 registering a mere 42
and 54% of average rainfall respectively(96); in 19O7 crops were damaged by
a plague of locusts, in 1909 by abnormally heavy rains(97). Yet even in the
good year of 1912, migration, at 6076, was only 33% down on the 191O-15 average.
Significantly, the figures show that some 11% of migrants did not return, and
indeed it is during this first wave of migration that the first permanent urban
Ovambo communities in the Police Zone were noted (98). It is perhaps not
surprising that migrants formed a greater proportion of the total populations
of the two southernmost tribes, Ondonga and Ukwambi (resp. 10.4% and 7.0% for
the year to June 1911) than of their northern neighbours Ukwanyama and Ongandjera
(5.0% and 2.5%); and that very few came from tribes in the NW of Ovamboland or
the Okavango(99). That said, and notwithstanding the fact that contemporary
population estimates were very approximate, 10% was a remarkably high proportion,
and of course a much greater fraction of active men.
The "necessary" character of labour migration can therefore be established with
reasonably certainty. Recurrent migration itself does, however presuppose the
articulation of two modes of production, whether the methods employed by the
dominant power be direct, indirect or laissez-faire. In this the policy
decisions of the German colonial regime were crucial. Contrary to later legend,
the authorities took an active interest in Ovamboland both before and after the
war of genocide, not least in its potential for agricultural exploitation. It
was the preoccupation of the German governor Leutwein with the dispossession of
the southern tribes, as he himself was careful to point out(lOO) -^ hat persuaded
him not to intervene actively. Even so, an attempt to obtain coarsens at Ion from
the Ukwembi king for the robbing of two traders in his territory nearly provoked
a war in 1902 when an over-confident subordinate officer set off with an armed
detachment to enforce payment, and hostilities were only averted by Ovambo
restraint(101). Thereafter, and more particularly from 1904 onwards, the Germans
seem to have calculated that the conquest of Ovamboland was not worth the military
cost: the Portuguese, after all, despite the establishment of several forts on
the northern fringes in 1907 had lost an entire 50O-man column in Sept.19O4(102).
From this time too, with the war effort at its height, the Germans became heavily
dependent on Ovambo labour in stategic construction projects, and later on the
lucrative copper and diamond mines. The last decade of German rule was character!;
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by a chronic and growing labour shortage and repeated attempts to find foreign
sources of contract labour, none of which succeeded except in the case of S.A.(103).
But even the employment of as many as 7OOO from the latter source in 1911(104)
did not break their strategic reliance on Ovamboland.
Thus when during the Herero uprising Nechale, king of East Ondonga, began to
show increasing hostility, and labour migration was cut off altogether after
an accidental attack upon a contingent of migrants, an emissary was sent North
with conciliatory messages and the good offices of the long-serving missionary
Rautanen invoked, apparently with some success(105). In 1908 the relationship
between the main Ovambo kingdoms and the colony were formalised in a series
of protection treaties, in which German suzerainty was acknowledged(106). This
diplomatic coup may not have been unconnected with arrangements then being made
by the government and mines to send in relief supplies of grain and rice to
alleviate successive crop failures. 80,OOOkg (nearly 80 tons) were imported
in 1908/9, and similar quantities in later years, a practice said in 1915 by
the mission to be regular, to which, significantly, it was sent "for free
distribution"(107). Following a visit by Hpt. Streitwolf and now ex-missionary
Tonjes in 1911 to assess its labour-exporting potential, the administration
enacted a regulation to guarantee free rail travel and board for migrants; and
shortly before the S.A. invasion, began drilling boreholes alongside the
waterless track to Namutoni, as well as the construction of a railway from
Otjiwarongo to Okabakana in Ondonga(108).
It would appear therefore that the Germans were preparing, particularly during
their last years, for a long period of non-intervention in Ovamboland itself.
Without even the beginnings of "indirect rule", political relations remained
on the diplomatic level, rather similar in a way to British-style protectorate
agreements. The success of the policy, however, requited at least the tacit
collaboration of the indigenous ruling class, and herein lies one of the more
intriguing, if still obscure factors in the power-equation. Up to 1904, the
southern kings, particularly Nechale and Kambonde of Ondonga and Negumbo of
Ukwambi, had shown both unremitting hostility to the German regime and an
accurate appreciation of Leutwein's ultimate intentions(109). Furthermore, the
drought of 19OO/1-O2/3 was at least as severe as that in 19O8, without leading
to an equivalent flood of emigration. The overwhelming demonstration of German
military power and ruthlessness in the extermination of the Hersro, German
diplomatic overtures, and the Portuguese punitive expedition in 19O7 may have
persuaded them to opt for the accommodation with the German regime implied
in the 1908 treaties. They may also have calculated (correctly) that they
could get round the restrictions of the Ordinance of 25th Jan.1906(110), which
prohibited "the importation of fire-arms, ammunition, horses and spirits into
Amboland" and established a licencing system for traders and their goods, by
trading or smuggling through Angola. At any rate, trade from the South was
reported several years later to have ceased altogether(111), and yet the tacit
alliance held. Indeed, arms were still being smuggled in as late as 1930 via the
Congo and Angola(112).
Whatever their other reasons, a powerful incentive for their collaboration in
the promotion of labour migration lay in the material advantages the kings could
draw by controlling the operation of the system. Schlettwein, a future governor,
gives us a revealing insight into the mechanism of control which already existed
by 1907(113): "Der Hauptling bestimmt die Leute and sobickt aie unter einem Vor-
maun aus, urn Kleider und sonstige Gebrauchsgegenstande zu verdienen. Der Terrain,
an dem celch ein Trupp Ovambo3 wieder zur Stelle zu sein hat, wlrd geuau fest
gesetzt, und wehe demjenigen, der nicht zur rechter Zeit zuruckkommt.. ..Fur den
verdienten Lohn mussen die Leute waren kaufen, die sie Ihrem Hauptling samtlich
verzulegen haben. Der Hauptling wablt sich dann das, was ibm gef&llt, aus und
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bestimxnt uber das andere ganz nach Willklir' . * Having sold slaves to the
Portuguese for many years, the kings clearly regarded the export of labour
as an alternative means of earning surplus, usually in the form of consumer
goods.
It is doubtful whether the rate of migration between 1910 and 1914 would have
allowed such personal supervision of returning migrants or their recruitment
dispatch; nor is it indicated to what extent recruitment was voluntary. Never-
theless, the fact that a similar system was found to be operating more than
20 years later suggests a basic continuity in the methods of tribal supervision:
"Jede Schwarze, der aus den Hinen kommt. Muss sich sofort zum Hauptling begeben
und genauen Sericht uber alle Ereignisse erstatten und die erwanteten Geschenke
abllefern"(114). It is probably a safe conclusion that there existed a tacit
division of responsibility for the regulation of each end of the cycle between
the colonial,and the tribal authorities. The German regulations of 19O6 provided
for the compulsory licencing of all labour recruitors and the registration of
their recruits at the two border stations, Okaukuenjo and Wamutoni, through which,
because they lay astride the only passable exit-routes, the vast majority of
v migrants were forced to travel. The diamond mines set up a recruiting administration
in 1911 with the unofficial blessing of the government, who appointed as their
recruiting officer (the only one to be licenced) and "Native Commissioner at
Luderitzbucht"(115) appropriately the former missionary Tonjes. The government
thus supervised the distribution of contract workers within the territory, while
delegating recruitment to the tribal monarchies. They for their part attempted
to prevent permanent migration by putting migrants under their own representatives,
by stipulating a short maximum period of absence, usually 6 months(116), fcnd by
sanctions against those who disobeyed tribal discipline.
Individual and collective self-activity and the development of a "worker-ronsciousne
amongst migrant workers is not easy to determine, partly for lack of information,
but partly because the range of opportunities open to them to vary their conditions,
given the probable variability of tribal control, cannot be precisely stated.
Monthly statistics of migration for 1910-14(117) reveal that, far from being a
. steady flow, the numbers of outgoing migrants varied sharply from one month to the
next. The most general impression, taking the sequence as a whole, is that the
rate of migration was determined more by climatic conditions than by tribal selectic
f although that is not to say that the organisation and dispatch of migrants was not
^ regulated by the tribal authority. Annually, the pattern shows a characteristic
double peak, closely followirig the start and the end of the rains, which :.ndicates
that men usually waited until after the preparation and planting of the fields or
alternatively the end of the wet-season cattle migration and the harvest before
setting off. Statistics for returning migrants show a definite but by no means
* The chief chooses the men and sends them out under a foreman to earn clothes
and other useful articles. The final date by which such a party has to be back
is stipulated precisely, and woe betide anyone who doesn't return at the correct
time. ...With their earnings the men must buy goods, all of which they are
required to set down before their chief. The chief then takes for himself whatever
he likes, and disposes of the rest quite arbitrarily.
Every black who returns from the mines must report immediately to the chief and
give a detailed account of everything that happened and hand over the gifts
expected of him.
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rigid correlation of frequency with those for emigration at a lag of about 6
months. In other words, the tribal limitation of the period of absence was
effective, but only partially so; and indeed the correlation begins progressively
to break down in 1913-14. As important, perhaps, was the fact that a 5 - 7
 ;
month trip allowed many to return at the end of the dry season, when cattle
pasturing and the organisation of field preparation made their heaviest demands
on male labour-power, and others to be in time for the cattle trek. A comparison
of 1912 with the drought years of 1911 and 13 reveals that, as one might expect,
the peaks were much reduced, in expectation of good crops, but that in remaining
months the levels of migration were much the same. It also suggests that In
drought years men held back until crops and pasture were seen to be failing before
being forced to migrate in greater than usual numbers.'
The above analysis shows several general conclusions to be drawn, if only
tentatively. First, labour migration was subject to the demands of the seasonal
cycle of subsistence production, which was, as we saw earlier, complex and tightly
Integrated. Second, although for a substantial percentage of emigrants the
"necessity" or involuntary nature of migration itself was determined by climatic
or political forces beyond their control, for a variable number it was "optional"
in the sense of not being essential for the very survival of themselves or their
families. On the other hand, for a large proportion, presumably including many
of those who travelled "out of season", it was structurally necessary whatever
the contingent variables. Third, the migrant's timing of his departure and return
and the length of his absence represented a rational attempt to integrate and align
means of subsistence into the agricultural cycle of production.
If the conditions in their homeland which forced them to migrate were desparate,
contract workers1 experiences en route and at the point of production can hardly
have left them in much better shape. Intending recruits had to make a 2-3 week
journey to the Otavi railway on foot across a plain waterless for much of the
year (118) - perhaps .a further reason for the peaks of migration at each end of
the rainy season. With many still coming South because of the famine, Pritchard
noted during his journey to Ovamboland in Aug. 1915: "The condition of those we
met was often pitiable - many are reported to have died In the bush through
exhaustion" (119). The exigencies of bare survival and the risk of attack by robber
bands made travelling In groups advantageous: the attack which provoked the ban
on migration in 1904 was on "eine friedllch singende Wanderovambotruppe11*.
Whether or not tribal control was effective outside Ovamboland, such an ordeal ^
was conducive to the building of a group solidarity within the party which carried v
over into their period as wage-labourers. As the S.A. Administrator noted In :
1921(120): "Ovambos come South in parties, and return in a similar manner".
Furthermore, "they are averse to being distributed amongst individual employers,
especially on farms where wages are low". The German system of distribution,
despite the subjection of contract workers to the Police Zone Pass Law(121), does
not seem to have established total control, and contract workers used their limited
freedom to choose and bargain with employers. As one observer commented, "ste
arbeiten lieber in geschlossenen Trupps und suchen deshalb die Diamantem felder
den Bergbau und den Mlnenbetrieb"(122)**.
* a peacefully singing party of Ovambo migrants.
** They prefer to work together in gangs and because of this ma.ce for the
diamond fields, mining and mine work.
Since it became apparent that the Ovambos were deserting to.the Luder-
itzbucht diamond fields at a disturbingly high rate, 250 men were brought
In from the- Cape on one-year contracts.
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Conditions and wages on farms were notorious, and it is not surprising to find
them being universally avoided(123).
Equally significant, and highly suggestive, is the fact that the Tsumeb copper
mine appears to have been used quite deliberately as a temporary staging-post
en route to the diamond fields, with extreme variations in the size of its
workforce:
Number of workers at Tsumeb, 1907-11.
5/O7-2/O8 3-4/08 5/08 O8/(J c4/O9 09/10 10/11 12/10 early 11
extremes 25O-75O 600-1300 401-1014 722-964
average 1150 950 9O0 6OO 636 416 9OO
Source; Nitzsche, pl35-6, citing D. Kbit, 1909,10,11, "Otavi-Minon-und
Eisenbahngesellschaft".
The mine management was even forced - this at a time of rapidly increasing migration
from Ovamboland - to import expensive foreign contract workers during 191C: "Da
sich eine starke Abwanderung der Ovambos nach den Ltinderitzbuchter Diamanten-
feldern stbrend bemerkbar raachte, wurden 250 Kapleute auf einjahrigen Vert rag
eingefuhrt"(124). The reasons for the workers' preference were probably quite
simple. Diamond digging was surface work, whereas copper mining had already gone
underground. Further, the two biggest diamond companies, employing half the workers
on the fields, operated 9*5 hr. shifts, with a half hour mealbreak and Sunday off,
compared with the 1O-11 hours and 7 hours on Sunday generally enforced on other '
mines for less wages(l25). That contract workers were capable of using this tactic
at such an early stage presumes an active appreciation of the bargaining power of
individual workers during periods of acute labour shortage(126) - they were, after
all, subject to the forced labour legislation operative in the Police Zone - and
also a widespread network of communication amongst themselves.
This episode had an interesting sequel in 1924-5- Before the setting up of the
semi-official recruiting monopoly, SWANLA(127), in 1926, S.A. control over
recruitment did not fully extend, despite a flurry of legislation and a couple of
attempts to ration the supply among the largest employers, to tho distribution of
contract workers to the various sectors. In a situation of chronic labour shortage,
migrants therefore probably retained a limited freedom to choose their empLoyer.
During 1924, no fewer than 296 workers on the diamond fields contacted scirvy,
of whom 52 died. At the same time, the number of Ovambo contract workers dropped
from 3648 on the 1st May to "under 2000" by the end of November. Between Jine and
November, the company succeeded in recruiting only 334 replacements from O/amboland,
with a paltry 71 in the final 3 months of that period. It is not unlikely zhat
returning migrants warned their comrades off this death-trap. Indeed in t*e following
year while recruitment from northern Namibia increased by over 10%, the nunber
actually on the mines fell by 22% and on the diamond fields themselves by J8%.
Conditions at this time were so extreme that 163 Xhosa contract workers wh>, the
Administrator complained, "had a mania for making complaints", were driven in
desperation to desert and make for S.A. across the Namib, where it least 1-1 died(128).
Despite frantic efforts to recruit abroad, C.D.M. estimated that it was still 2000
short of its requirements in Nov. 1924, when Ovambos formed a baie 54% of its
total workforce(129).
The scope for such discrimination was, however, strictly limited. Conditions on
the railway construction sites, the diamond fields, and in the m:.ne compounds wer*-
often rudimentary, and occasionally a danger to life. Most sites were well away
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froro urban centres and without access to any locally grown produce. On the
diamond fields, totally isolated from water* building materials or sources of
food, living conditions for workers must have been miserable indeed. The mortality
rate, at 77 per 1000 in the latter half of 1909, rose to 165 in 1910 before
subsiding to 41 in the year to March 1913. At Tsumcb, In contrast, the rate
stood at 30.4 for 1909 and 23.5 for the first 11 months of 1910(130). Few of
the 782 dealths that occurred in that 45-nonth period on the diamond fields
can be attributed to the work itself, which consisted In searching and sifting
for stones in the Namib sands. At Tsumeb, where the standard rations, said to
be an improvement pn what was given before 1910, consisted of Sib. potatoes,
l*albs. rice and ?*jlb. meat per day, it would not be surprising to find scurvy
among the causes of death for the 163 workers who died In 1909 and 10. A proper
compound does not appear to have been completed until 1926(131). In these
circumstances, with the harsh labour discipline habitual in a forced labour
economy, sheer survival must often have been the worker's first concern.
It should also be borne in mind that emigration to alternative centres of
employment, such as the Witwatersrand, was virtually impossible once inside
the Police Zone, and desertion sometimes highly dangerous except where an . *
urban population was readily accessible. It is perhaps not surprising that v
contemporary reports mention no strikes or other forms of overt collective
action by contract workers from the North. But there are a few references to
either passive or direct resistance by workers from the Cape. In Oct. 1910
long-standing grievances amongst construction workers on the Wi.lhelmstal section
of the Karibib-Windhoek railway escalated into a strike, which was suppressed
with deliberate brutality by the German military(132). Significantly, this
action sparked off protests in solidarity by workers on neighbouring sections
of the line, and a subsequent investigation revealed that on one of them,
"die Eingeborenen haben...viermal gestreikt", once in solidarity, and 3 times
over working conditions. Whether these workers were all South African as well
is not stated, but incidents such as this cannot have failed to make their
mark on the perceptions of Ovambo fellow-workers; nor can the high level of
passive resistance to the German regime within the Police Zone between 1904
and 15 (133) have completely passed them by.
By the last years of German colonial rule, the increase in the rate of surplus
appropriation and the decline in the level of production within the subsistence
mode had made labour migration, as the only external means generally available /
of meeting subsistence needs, necessary for a substantial minority of family
producers. A system of labour supply and distribution was established through
the tacit collaboration of the tribal ruling class with the colonial admin-
istration. Most migrants attempted to fit their period of absence into the
seasonal cycle of agricultural production. To a number, however, such an
integration of productive activities was already losing its importance; and
some of these settled permanently in the Police Zone as wage-labourers. Whatever
the balance of their class interests, once thrown upon the labour market, at
this time governed by a forced labour regime of extreme brutality, migrant workers
demonstrated a lively appreciation of their bargaining power in a situation of
chronic, often acute labour shortages.
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